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Abstract. Fusing the scores of several biometric systems is a very promising approach to
improve the overall system’s accuracy. Despite many works in the literature, it is surprising that
there is no coordinated effort in making a benchmark database available. It should be noted
that fusion in this context consists not only of multimodal fusion, but also intramodal fusion,
i.e., fusing systems using the same biometric modality but different features, or same features
but using different classifiers. Building baseline systems from scratch often prevents researchers
from putting more efforts in understanding the fusion problem. This paper describes a database of
scores taken from experiments carried out on the XM2VTS face and speaker verification database.
It then proposes several fusion protocols and provides some state-of-the-art tools to evaluate the
fusion performance.
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1 Motivation
Biometric authentication (BA) is a process of verifying an identity claim using a person’s behavioral
and physiological characteristics. BA is becoming an important alternative to traditional authenti-
cation methods such as keys (“something one has”, i.e., by possession) or PIN numbers (“something
one knows”, i.e., by knowledge) because it is essentially “who one is”, i.e., by biometric information.
Therefore, it is not susceptible to misplacement or forgetfulness. Examples of biometric modalities
are fingerprint, face, voice, hand-geometry and retina scans [16]. However, today, biometric-based
security systems (devices, algorithms, architectures) still have room for improvement, particularly in
their accuracy, tolerance to various noisy environments and scalability as the number of individuals
increases. Biometric data is often noisy because of deformable nature of biometric traits, corruption
by environmental noise, variability over time and occlusion by the user’s accessories. The higher the
noise, the less reliable the biometric system becomes.
One very promising approach to improve the overall system’s accuracy is to fuse the scores of
several biometric systems [17]. Despite many works in the literature, e.g. [18, 10], it is surprising that
there is no coordinated effort in making a benchmark database available for such task. This work is
one step towards better sharing of scores to focus on better understanding of the fusion mechanism.
In the literature, there are several approaches towards studying fusion. One practice is to used
virtual identities whereby a biometric modality from one person is paired with the biometric modality
of another person. From the experiment point of view, these biometric modalities belong to the same
person. While this practice is somewhat accepted in the literature, it was questioned that whether
this was a right thing to do or not during the 2003 Workshop on Multimodal User Authentication [9].
The fundamental issue here is the independence assumption that two or more biometric traits of a
single person are independent from each other1. Another practice is more reasonable: use off-the-shelf
biometric systems [14] and quickly acquire scores. While this is definitely a better solution, committing
to acquire the systems and to collect the data is admittedly a very time-consuming process. None
of the mentioned approaches prevails over the others in understanding the problem of fusion. There
are currently on-going but independent projects in the biometric community to acquire multimodal
biometric databases, e.g., the BANCA [1], XM2VTS [20], BIOMET [6], and MYCT [24] multimodal
databases. BANCA and XM2VTS contain face and speech modalities; BIOMET contains face, speech,
fingerprint, hand and signature modalities; and MYCT contains ten-print fingerprint and signature
modalities.
As a matter of fact, most reported works in the literature about fusion often concentrates on
treatment of the baseline systems. While baseline systems are definitely important, the subject of
fusion is unfortunately downplayed. Hence, we propose here not only to publish scores, but also to
provide a clear documentation of the baseline systems, well-defined fusion protocols and provide a
common set of evaluation tools so that experimental results can be compared. The scores are taken
from the publicly available XM2VTS face and speech database2. It should be mentioned here that
there exists another software tool that analyses biometric error rate called PRESS[34]3. However, it
does not include the DET curve. The tools proposed here, together with the database, provide a new
plot called Expected Performance Curve (EPC) [3] and a significant test specially designed to test the
Half Total Error Rate (HTER) [4].
Section 2 explains the XM2VTS database, the Lausanne Protocols and the proposed Fusion Pro-
tocols. Section 3 documents the 8 baseline systems that can be used for fusion. Section 4 presents
the evaluation criteria, i.e., how experiments should be reported and compared. A set of evaluation
tools to facilitate experimentation are presented in Section 5. Some experiments using the proposed
fusion protocol are reported in Section 6. This is followed by conclusions in Section 7. Together with
the evaluation tool, a recommended cross-validation procedure is also given and is presented in the
appendix.
1To the best of our knowledge, there is no work in the literature that approves or disapproves such assumption.
2The database and tools are available in http://www.idiap.ch/∼norman/fusion
3Available in. http://it.stlawu.edu/∼msch/biometrics/downloads.htm
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2 Database and Protocols
2.1 The XM2VTS database and the Lausanne Protocols
The XM2VTS database [23] contains synchronised video and speech data from 295 subjects, recorded
during four sessions taken at one month intervals. On each session, two recordings were made, each
consisting of a speech shot and a head shot. The speech shot consisted of frontal face and speech
recordings of each subject during the recital of a sentence.
The database is divided into three sets: a training set, an evaluation set and a test set. The
training set (LP Train) was used to build client models, while the evaluation set (LP Eval) was used
to compute the decision thresholds (as well as other hyper-parameters) used by classifiers. Finally,
the test set (LP Test) was used to estimate the performance.
The 295 subjects were divided into a set of 200 clients, 25 evaluation impostors and 70 test
impostors. There exists two configurations or two different partitioning approaches of the training
and evaluation sets. They are called Lausanne Protocol I and II, denoted as LP1 and LP2 in this
paper. In both configurations, the test set remains the same. Their difference is that there are three
training shots per client for LP1 and four training shots per client for LP2. Table 1 is the summary
of the data. The last column of Table 1 is explained in Section 2.2.
Note that LP Eval’s of LP1 and LP2 are used to calculate the optimal thresholds that will be used
in LP Test. Results are reported only for the test sets, in order to be as unbiased as possible (using
an a priori selected threshold). More details can be found in [20].
2.2 The Fusion Protocols
The fusion protocols are built upon the Lausanne Protocols. Before the discussion, it is impor-
tant to distinguish two categories of approaches: client-independent and client-dependent fusion ap-
proaches. The former approach has only a global fusion function that is common to all identities
in the database. The latter approach has a different fusion function for a different identity. It has
been reported that client-dependent fusion is better than client-independent fusion, given that there
are “enough” client-dependent score data. Examples of client-dependent fusion approach are client-
dependent threshold [32], client-dependent score normalisation [11] or different weighing of expert
opinions using linear [15] or non-linear combination [19]. The fusion protocols that are described here
can be client-dependent or client-independent.
It should be noted that one can fuse any of the 8 baseline experiments in LP1 and 5 baseline
experiments in LP2 (to be detailed in Section 3). We propose a full combination of all these systems.
This protocol is called FP-full. Hence, there are altogether 28 − 8− 1 = 248 possible combinations
for LP1 and 25− 5− 1 = 26 for LP2. The reasons for minus one and minus the number of experts are
that using zero expert and using a single expert are not valid options. However, some constraints are
Table 1: The Lausanne Protocols of XM2VTS database. The last column shows the terms used in the
fusion protocols presented in Section 2.2. LP Eval corresponds to the Fusion protocols’ development
set while LP Test corresponds to the Fusion Protocols’ evaluation set.
Data sets Lausanne Protocols Fusion
LP1 LP2 Protocols
LP Train client accesses 3 4 NIL
LP Eval client accesses 600 (3× 200) 400 (2× 200) Fusion dev
LP Eval impostor accesses 40,000 (25× 8× 200) Fusion dev
LP Test client accesses 400 (2× 200) Fusion eva
LP Test impostor accesses 112,000 (70× 8× 200) Fusion eva
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useful. For instance, in some situations, one is constrained to using a single biometric modality. In
this case, we propose an intramodal fusion (FP-intramodal) . When no constraint is imposed, we
propose a full combination (FP-multimodal). FP-intramodal contains 25 − 5 − 1 = 26 face-expert
fusion experiments for LP1, 23 − 3 − 1 = 4 speech-expert fusion experiments for LP1, 1 face-expert
fusion experiment for LP2 and 23 − 3− 1 = 4 speech expert-fusion experiments for LP2. Hence, FP-
intramodal contains 35 fusion experiments. The second protocol contains
∑5
m=1
∑3
n=1(
5Cm
3Cn) =
217 combinations, where nCk is “n choose k”. As can be seen, the first three fusion protocols contain
an exponential number of combinations. For some specific study, it is also useful to introduce a smaller
set of combinations, each time using only two baseline experts, according to the nature of the base-
expert. This protocol is called FP-2. Three categories of fusion types have been identified under FP-2,
namely multimodal fusion (using different biometric traits), intramodal fusion with different feature
sets and intramodal fusion with the same feature set but different classifiers. There are altogether 32
such combinations. The pairings of base-experts for fusion are shown in Table 2 for LP1 and LP2.
Note that there are 8 biometric samples in the XM2VTS database on a per client basis. They are
used in the following decomposition: 3 samples are used to train the baseline experts in LP1 (and 4
in LP2) on LP Train. There are remaining 3 samples in the in LP1 Eval (and only 2 in LP2 Eval).
Finally, for both protocols, 2 client accesses for testing in the test set. Because fusion classifiers cannot
be trained using scores from the training set, or they are simply not available in the current settings,
we are effectively using the LP Eval to train the fusion classifiers and then LP Test to test the fusion
classifiers’ performance on the LP Test. To avoid confusion in terminology used, we call LP Eval as
the fusion development set and LP Test as the fusion evaluation set.
Because we are left with two sets of scores (fusion development and evaluation sets), we propose
to use Algorithm 1 detailed in Appendix A, so that we can still obtain two sets of fused scores : one on
the fusion development set and one on the fusion evaluation set. This is important because a threshold
will have to be chosen from the development set and the same threshold will be fixed a priori on the
evaluation set. In this way, the final reported fusion performance will be unbiased with respect to the
threshold parameter.
The use of Algorithm 1 is only highly recommended but not obligatory. One can also train a fusion
classifier using the evaluation set and also using the same set to output fused scores. Although these
scores are biased since they are used to optimise the classifier parameters, we found that, in practice,
the threshold calculated this way is often surprisingly acceptable for the test set.
3 Baseline System Description
There are altogether 8 baseline systems4. All the 8 baseline systems were used in LP1. On the other
hand, 5 out of 8 were used in LP2. This results in 13 baseline experiments (for LP1 and LP2). The
following explanation describe these systems in terms of their features, classifiers, and the complete
system which is made up of the pair (feature type, classifier).
3.1 Face and Speech Features
The face baseline experts are based on the following features:
1. FH: normalised face image concatenated with its RGB Histogram (thus the abbreviation
FH) [21].
2. DCTs: DCTmod2 features [33] extracted from face images with a size of 40 × 32 (rows ×
columns) pixels. The Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficients are calculated from an
8 × 8 window with horizontal and vertical overlaps of 50%, i.e., 4 pixels in each direction.
Neighbouring windows are used to calculate the “delta” features. The result is a set of 35
4In our website, we also accept public contribution of score files. Each contributor will have to explain clearly their
baseline system. Hence, more fusion protocols may be incorporated in the future.
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feature vectors, each having a dimensionality of 18. (s indicates the use of this small image
compared to the bigger size image with the abbreviation b.)
3. DCTb: Similar to DCTs except that the input face image has 80 × 64 pixels. The result is a
set of 221 feature vectors, each having a dimensionality of 18.
The speech baseline experts are based on the following features:
1. LFCC: The Linear Filter-bank Cepstral Coefficient (LFCC) [31] speech features were computed
with 24 linearly-spaced filters on each frame of Fourier coefficients sampled with a window length
of 20 milliseconds and each window moved at a rate of 10 milliseconds. 16 DCT coefficients are
computed to decorrelate the 24 coefficients (log of power spectrum) obtained from the linear
filter-bank. The first temporal derivatives are added to the feature set.
2. PAC: The Phase Auto-Correlation Mel Filter-bank Cepstral Coefficient (PAC-MFCC) fea-
tures [13] are derived with a window length of 20 milliseconds and each window moves at a
rate of 10 milliseconds. 20 DCT coefficients are computed to decorrelate the 30 coefficients
obtained from the Mel-scale filter-bank. The first temporal derivatives are added to the feature
set.
3. SSC: Spectral Subband Centroid (SSC) features, originally proposed for speech recognition [25],
were used for speaker authentication in [30]. It was found that mean-subtraction could improve
these features significantly. The mean-subtracted SSCs are obtained from 16 coefficients. The γ
parameter, which is a parameter that raises the power spectrum and controls how much influence
the centroid, is set to 0.7 [29]. Also, the first temporal derivatives are added to the feature set.
3.2 Classifiers
Two different types of classifiers were used for these experiments: Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs)
and a Bayes Classifier using Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) [5]. While in theory both classifiers
could be trained using any of the previously defined feature sets, in practice MLPs are better at
matching feature vectors of fixed-size while GMMs are better at matching sequences (feature vectors
of unequal size). Whatever the classifier is, the hyper-parameters (e.g. the number of hidden units
for MLPs or the number of Gaussian components for GMMs) are tuned on the evaluation set LP1
Eval. The same set of hyper-parameters are used in both LP1 and LP2 configurations of the XM2VTS
database.
For each client-specific MLP, the feature vectors associated to the client are treated as positive
patterns while all other feature vectors not associated to the client are treated as negative patterns. All
MLPs reported here were trained using the stochastic version of the error-back-propagation training
algorithm [5].
For the GMMs, two competing models are often needed: a world and a client-dependent model.
Initially, a world model is first trained from an external database (or a sufficiently large data set) using
the standard Expectation-Maximisation algorithm [5]. The world model is then adapted for each client
to the corresponding client data using the Maximum-A-Posteriori adaptation [12] algorithm.
3.3 Baseline Systems
The baseline experiments based on DCTmod2 feature extraction were reported in [7] while those based
on normalised face images and RGB histograms (FH features) were reported in [21]. Details of the
experiments, coded in the pair (feature, classifier), for the face experts, are as follows:
1. (FH, MLP) Features are normalised Face concatenated with Histogram features. The client-
dependent classifier used is an MLP with 20 hidden units. The MLP is trained with geometrically
transformed images [21].
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2. (DCTs, GMM) The face features are the DCTmod2 features calculated from an input face
image of 40 × 32 pixels, hence, resulting in a sequence of 35 feature vectors each having 18
dimensions. There are 64 Gaussian components in the GMM. The world model is trained using
all the clients in the training set [7].
3. (DCTb, GMM) Similar to (DCTs,GMM), except that the features used are DCTmod2 features
calculated from an input face image of 80×64 pixels. This produces in a sequence of 221 feature
vectors each having 18 dimensions. The corresponding GMM has 512 Gaussian components [7].
4. (DCTs, MLP) Features are the same as those in (DCTs,GMM) except that an MLP is used
in place of a GMM. The MLP has 32 hidden units [7]. Note that in this case a training example
consists of a big single feature vector with a dimensionality of 35× 18. This is done by simply
concatenating 35 feature vectors each having 18 dimensions5.
5. (DCTb, MLP) The features are the same as those in (DCTb,GMM) except that an MLP with
128 hidden units is used. Note that in this case the MLP in trained on a single feature vector
with a dimensionality of 221× 18 [7].
and for the speech experts:
1. (LFCC, GMM) This is the Linear Filter-bank Cepstral Coefficients (LFCC) obtained from
the speech data of the XM2VTS database. The GMM has 200 Gaussian components, with the
minimum relative variance of each Gaussian fixed to 0.5, and the MAP adaptation weight equals
0.1. This is the best known model currently available [27] under clean conditions.
2. (PAC, GMM) The same GMM configuration as in LFCC is used. Note that in general,
200-300 Gaussian components would give about 1% of difference of HTER [27]. This system
is particularly robust to very noisy conditions (less than 6 dBs, as tested on the NIST2001
one-speaker detection task).
3. (SSC, GMM) The same GMM configuration as in LFCC is used [29]. This system is known
to provide an optimal performance under moderately noisy conditions (18-12 dBs, as tested on
NIST2001 one-speaker detection task).
4 Evaluation Criteria
There are three important concepts about evaluation of a biometric system: types of errors in biometric
authentication, threshold criterion and evaluation criterion. The types of errors are false acceptance
and false rejection (see Section 4.1). A threshold criterion refers to a strategy to choose a threshold
which is necessarily tuned on a development set. An evaluation criterion is used to measure the final
performance and is necessarily calculated on an evaluation set. Both are discussed in Sections 4.2
and 4.3. Section 4.4 addresses the issue of measuring the gain due to fusion as compared to individual
baseline expert systems. Section 4.5 discusses how to visualise the evaluation criterion. It also
deals with the case of visualising the performance of several systems using one single curve. Finally,
Section 4.6 presents a significance test that can be used to compare the performance of two systems
using the evaluation criterion.
5This may explain why MLP, an inherently discriminative classifier, has worse performance compared to GMM, a
generative classifier. With high dimensionality yet having only a few training examples, the MLP cannot be trained
optimally. This may affect its generalisation on unseen examples. By treating the features as a sequence, GMM was
able to generalise better and hence is more adapted to this feature set.
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4.1 Types of Errors
A fully operational biometric system makes a decision using the following decision function:
F (x) =
{
accept if y(x) > ∆
reject otherwise,
(1)
where y(x) is the output of the underlying expert supporting the hypothesis that the biometric sample
received x belongs to a client. The variables that follow will be derived from y(x). For simplicity,
we write y instead of y(x). The same convention applies to variables that follow. Because of the
accept-reject outcomes, the system may make two types of errors, i.e., false acceptance (FA) and false
rejection (FR). Normalised versions of FA and FR are often used and called false acceptance rate
(FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR), respectively. They are defined as:
FAR(∆) =
FA(∆)
NI
, (2)
FRR(∆) =
FR(∆)
NC
. (3)
where FA and FR count the number of FA and FR accesses, respectively; and NI and NC are the
total number of impostor and client accesses, respectively.
4.2 Threshold Criterion
To choose an “optimal threshold” ∆, it is necessary to define a threshold criterion. This has to be
done on a development set. Two commonly used criteria are the Weighted Error Rate (WER) and
Equal Error Rate (EER). WER is defined as:
WER(α, ∆) = αFAR(∆) + (1− α) FRR(∆), (4)
where α ∈ [0, 1] balances between FAR and FRR. A special case of WER is EER, which assumes that
the costs of FA and FR are equal. It further assumes that the class prior distributions of client and
impostor accesses are equal. As a result α = 0.5. In this case, Eqn. (4) becomes:
EER(∆) =
1
2
(FAR(∆) + FRR(∆)) . (5)
Let ∆∗α be the optimal threshold that minimises WER on a development set. It can be calculated as
follows:
∆∗ = arg min
∆
|αFAR(∆)− (1− α) FRR(∆)|. (6)
Note that one could have also used a second minimisation criterion:
∆∗ = arg min
∆
WER(α, ∆). (7)
In theory, these two minimisation criteria should give identical results. In practice however, they
do not, because FAR and FRR are empirical functions and are not smooth. Eqn. (6) ensures that
the difference between weighted FAR and weighted FRR are as small as possible while Eqn. (7)
ensures that the sum of the two weighted terms are minimised. Because FAR is a decreasing function
while FRR is an increasing function of threshold, the first criterion takes advantage of this additional
information while the second criterion does not. Hence, the first criterion can more accurately estimate
the threshold and is used for evaluation in this study. Note that the EER criterion can be calculated
similarly by fixing α = 0.5.
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4.3 Evaluation Criterion
Having chosen an optimal threshold using the WER threshold criterion discussed previously, the final
performance is measured using Half Total Error Rate (HTER). Note that the threshold is found with
respect to a given α. It is defined as:
HTER(∆∗α) =
FAR(∆∗α) + FRR(∆
∗
α)
2
. (8)
It is important to note that the FAR and FRR do not have the same resolution. Because there are
more simulated impostor accesses than the client accesses, FRR changes more drastically when falsely
rejecting a client access whereas FAR changes less drastically when falsely accepting an impostor
access. Hence, when comparing the performance using HTER(∆∗α) from two systems (at the same
∆∗α), the question of whether the HTER difference is significant or not has to take into account the
imbalanced numbers of client and impostor accesses. This is discussed in Section 4.6.
Finally, it is important to note that HTER in Eqn. (8) is identical to EER in Eqn. (5) except
that HTER is a performance measure (calculated on an evaluation set whereas EER is a threshold
criterion optimised on a development set. Because of their usage in different context, EER should
not be interpreted as a performance measure (in place of HTER) to compare the performance of
different systems. Such practice, to our opinion, leads to an unrealistic comparison. The argument
is that in an actual operating system, the threshold has to be fixed a priori. This subject is further
discussed in Section 4.5. To distinguish these two concepts, when discussing HTER calculated on
a development set using a threshold criterion also calculated on the same set, the HTER should be
called a posteriori HTER. When discussing HTER calculated on an evaluation set with a threshold
optimised on a development set, the HTER should be called a priori HTER.
4.4 Measuring the Gain
This section presents the “gain ratio” to answer the question: “how much gain can one obtain out of
a given fusion experiment as compared to the baseline systems?”. Suppose that there are i = 1, . . . , N
baseline expert systems. HTERi is the HTER evaluation criterion (measured on an evaluation set)
associated to expert i and HTERCOM is the HTER associated to the combined system. The “gain
ratio” β has two definitions, as follow:
βmean =
meani(HTERi)
HTERCOM
βmin =
mini(HTERi)
HTERCOM
,
where βmean and βmin are the proportion of the HTER of the combined (fused) expert with respect to
the mean and the minimum HTER of the underlying experts i = 1, . . . , N . According to our previous
work, it is found theoretically and empirically that βmean ≥ 1 [26]. βmin, on the other hand, is a more
realistic criterion, i.e., one wishes to obtain better performance than the best underlying expert, but
there is no analytical proof that βmin ≥ 1.
4.5 Visualising the Performance
Perhaps the most commonly used performance visualising tool in the literature is the Decision Error
Trade-off (DET) curve [22], which is actually a Receiver Operator Curve (ROC) curve plotted on a
non-linear scale. It has been pointed out [3] that two DET curves resulted from two systems are not
comparable because such comparison does not take into account how the thresholds are selected. In
fact, this holds down to compare two DET curves at a given common threshold chosen a posteriori. It
was argued [3] that such threshold should be chosen a priori as well, based on a given criterion. This
is because when a biometric system is operational, the threshold parameter has to be fixed a priori.
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Figure 1: An EPC curve.
As a result, the Expected Performance Curve (EPC) [3] was proposed. We will adopt this evaluation
method, which is also in coherence with the original Lausanne Protocols defined for the XM2VTS
database.
The EPC curve simply plots HTER (in Eqn. (8)) versus α (as found in Eqn. (4)), since different
values of α give rise to different values of HTERs. The EPC curve can be interpreted in the same
manner as the DET curve, i.e., the lower the curve is, the better the performance but for the EPC
curve, the comparison is done at a given cost (controlled by α). An example of EPC Curve is shown
in Figure 1(a).
One advantage of EPC curve is that it can plot a pooled curve from several experiments (although
this could also be done with DET curves, but in this case, it would not take the threshold selection
into account). For instance, to compare two methods over M experiments, only one pooled curve is
necessary. This is done by calculating HTER at a given α point by taking into account all the false
acceptance and false rejection accesses over all M experiments. The pooled FAR and FRR across
j = 1, . . . , M experiments for a given α ∈ [0, 1] is defined as follow:
FARpooled(∆∗α) =
∑M
j=1 FA(∆
∗
α(j))
NI ×M
, (9)
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and
FRRpooled(∆∗α) =
∑M
j=1 FR(∆
∗
α(j))
NC ×M
, (10)
where ∆∗α(j) is the optimised threshold at a given α for expert j, NI is the number of impostor
accesses and NC is the number of client accesses. FA and FR count the number of false acceptance
and the number of false rejection at a given threshold ∆∗α(j). The pooled HTER is defined similarly
as in Eqn. (8) by using the pooled versions of FAR and FRR.
4.6 HTER Significance Test
Although there exists several statistical significance tests in the literature such as McNemar’s Test [8]
and Asymptotic Performance, it has been shown that HTER significance test [4] better reflects the
imbalance nature of precision in FAR and FRR.
When comparing two EPC curves that are very close to each other, with possible overlaps, it is
interesting to know if the difference between the two HTERs, at any given point of α, is significant or
not. In this case, it is recommended to employ a two-sided significance test as proposed in [4]. Under
some reasonable assumptions, it has been shown [4] that the difference of HTER of two systems (say
A and B) is normally distributed with the following variance:
σ2HTER =
FARA(1−FARA)+FARB(1−FARB)
4·NI +
FRRA(1−FRRA)+FRRB(1−FRRB)
4·NC
, (11)
where HTERA, FARA and FRRA are HTER, FAR and FRR of the first system labeled A and
similarly for the second system labeled B. NI and NC are the total number of impostor accesses and
client accesses, respectively. One can then compute the following z-statistics:
z =
HTERA −HTERB
σHTER
. (12)
Let us define D(z) as the cumulative density of a normal distribution. The significance of z is calculated
as D−1(z). In a standard two-sided test, |z| is used. In Eqn. (12), the sign of z is retained so that
z > 0 implies that HTERA > HTERB . Consequently, D
−1(z) > 0.5 and vice-versa for z < 0. An
example of plot of significance test is shown in Figure 1(b). This significance test is performed on EPC
curves shown in Figure 1(a). (DCTs,GMM) is system A whereas (PAC,GMM) is system B. Whenever
the EPC curve of system B is lower than that of system A (B is better than A), the corresponding
significance curve is more than 50%. Below 10% of confidence (or above 90% of confidence) indicates
that system B is significantly worse than A (or system A is significantly worse than B).
5 Evaluation Tools
There are several (software) tools provided:
• The main program. This program handles loading and fusion of all the 32 fusion experiments
in FP-2. There is also a sample program showing how the fusion can be done using the mean
operator. The output of the main program is shown in Table 2.
• Visualisation tool. This program plots two-dimensional scatter plot of scores with Gaussian
fittings for each class of scores. An example of scatter plot is shown in Figure 2. Gaussian
fittings can be very useful to predict fusion [28] especially when the Gaussian hypothesis is true.
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Figure 2: Scatter plot of two experts. Only 1% of data points are plotted here. Circles overlaid on
each cluster of scores is a Gaussian approximation of the respective class (client or impostor).
• Score diagnostic tool. This program takes as input fused scores and calculate HTERs, plots
class-dependent distributions, FAR and FRR versus threshold and DET curve. An example of
output of this program is shown in Figure 3.
• EPC curves. Last but not least, there is also a program that plots Expected Performance
Curve or EPC curve [3] (see Figure 1(a)). A detailed explanation of EPC can be found in
Section 4.5. Furthermore, another accompanying program actually compares two EPC curves
to see if the difference of two systems under comparison is significant or not using a two-sided
test [4], at various operating costs (see Figure 1(b)). A detailed explanation of this test can be
found in Sec 4.6.
6 Example of Fusion Experiments
Some experiments have been carried out in client-independent fusion setting (e.g. [26]) and client-
dependent fusion setting (e.g. [?]). In [26] client-independent FP-2 was performed using the mean
operator, Multi-Layer Perceptrons, Support Vector Machines [26]. Here, we show only fusion ex-
periments using the mean operator (see Table 2). For multimodal fusion, there are a total of 21
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Figure 3: A score diagnostic plot of two experts.
experiments from both LP1 and LP2 protocols. Similarly for fusion with different feature sets (same
modality), there are a total of 9 experiments (6 from LP1 and 3 from LP2). Finally, for fusion with
different classifiers (same feature set), there are only 2 experiments.
7 Conclusions
In this study, we presented a database, several fusion protocols in different scenarios and a set of
evaluation tools to encourage researchers to focus on the problem of biometric authentication score-
level fusion. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no work in the literature that provides a
benchmark database for score-level fusion. Several practical and state-of-the-art tools are also provided
so that experiments can be compared in a realistic and unbiased way.
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Algorithm 1 Risk Estimation (Θ, K,Z train,Ztest)
REM: Risk Estimation with K-fold Validation. See [2].
Θ : a set of values for a given hyper-parameter
Z i : a tuple (X i,Y i), for i ∈ {train, test} where
X : a set of patterns. Each pattern contains scores/hypothesis from base experts
Y : a set of labels ∈ {client, impostor}
Let ∪Kk=1Z
k = Ztrain and Z i ∩ Zj = ∅∀i,j
for each hyper-parameter θ ∈ Θ do
for each k = 1, . . . , K do
Fˆθ = train(θ, ∪
K
j=1,j 6=kZ
j)
Yˆkθ = test(Fˆθ , X
k)
end for
∆θ = thrdHTER
(
{Yˆkθ }
K
k=1, {Y
k}Kk=1
)
end for
θ∗ = arg minθ
(
LHTER
(
∆θ, {Yˆkθ }
K
k=1, {Y
k}Kk=1
))
Fˆθ∗ = train(θ
∗, Ztrain)
Yˆtestθ∗ = test(Fˆθ∗ , X
test)
return LHTER(∆θ∗ , Yˆtestθ∗ ,Y
test)
and Science (OFES) and the Swiss NSF through the NCCR on IM2. The author also thank Julian
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A Cross-Validation Procedure
Algorithm 1 [2] shows how K-fold cross-validation can be used to estimate the correct value of the
hyper-parameters of our fusion model, as well as the decision threshold used in the case of authenti-
cation. The basic framework of the algorithm is as follows: first perform K-fold cross-validation on
the training set by varying the hyper-parameter, and for each hyper-parameter, select the correspond-
ing decision threshold that minimises Half Total Error Rate (HTER); then choose the best hyper-
parameter according to this criterion and perform normal training with the best hyper-parameter on
the whole training set; finally test the resultant classifier on the test set with HTER evaluated on the
previously found decision threshold.
There are several points to note concerning Algorithm 1: Z is a set of labeled examples of the form
(X ,Y), where the first term is a set of patterns and the second term is a set of corresponding labels.
The “train” function receives a hyper-parameter θ and a training set, and outputs an optimal classifier
Fˆ by minimising the HTER on the training set. The “test” function receives a classifier Fˆ and a set of
examples, and outputs a set of scores for each associated example. The “thrdHTER” function returns
a decision threshold that minimises HTER by minimising |FAR(∆) − FRR(∆)| with respect to the
threshold ∆ (FAR(∆) and FRR(∆) are false acceptance and false rejection rates, as a function of ∆)
while LHTER returns the HTER value for a particular decision threshold. What makes this cross-
validation different from classical cross-validation is that there is only one single decision threshold
and the corresponding HTER value for all the held-out folds and for a given hyper-parameter θ. This
is because it is logical to union scores of all held-out folds into one single set of scores to select the
decision threshold (and obtain the corresponding HTER).
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Table 2: Results of combining two baseline experts using the mean operator according to FP-2.
(a) Fusion with different modalities for LP1
No. Fusion candidates HTER
1 ((FH,MLP)(LFCC,GMM)) 0.782
2 ((FH,MLP)(PAC,GMM)) 1.120
3 ((FH,MLP)(SSC,GMM)) 0.871
4 ((DCTs,GMM)(LFCC,GMM)) 0.543
5 ((DCTs,GMM)(PAC,GMM)) 1.436
6 ((DCTs,GMM)(SSC,GMM)) 1.149
7 ((DCTb,GMM)(LFCC,GMM)) 0.511
8 ((DCTb,GMM)(PAC,GMM)) 1.021
9 ((DCTb,GMM)(SSC,GMM)) 0.752
10 ((DCTs,MLP)(LFCC,GMM)) 0.840
11 ((DCTs,MLP)(PAC,GMM)) 1.138
12 ((DCTs,MLP)(SSC,GMM)) 1.333
13 ((DCTb,MLP)(LFCC,GMM)) 1.523
14 ((DCTb,MLP)(PAC,GMM)) 3.664
15 ((DCTb,MLP)(SSC,GMM)) 3.108
(b) Fusion with different feature sets for LP1
No. Fusion candidates HTER
1 ((FH,MLP)(DCTs,GMM)) 1.280
2 ((FH,MLP)(DCTb,GMM)) 1.122
3 ((FH,MLP)(DCTs,MLP)) 1.513
4 ((FH,MLP)(DCTb,MLP)) 1.960
5 ((LFCC,GMM)(SSC,GMM)) 1.595
6 ((PAC,GMM)(SSC,GMM)) 4.225
(c) Fusion with different classifiers for LP1
No. Fusion candidates HTER
1 ((DCTs,GMM)(DCTs,MLP)) 2.388
2 ((DCTb,GMM)(DCTb,MLP)) 3.063
(d) Fusion with different modalities for LP2
No. Fusion candidates HTER
1 ((FH,MLP)(LFCC,GMM)) 1.122
2 ((FH,MLP)(PAC,GMM)) 1.513
3 ((FH,MLP)(SSC,GMM)) 1.960
4 ((DCTb,GMM)(LFCC,GMM)) 1.836
5 ((DCTb,GMM)(PAC,GMM)) 2.388
6 ((DCTb,GMM)(SSC,GMM)) 3.672
(e) Fusion with different feature sets for LP2
No. Fusion candidates HTER
1 ((FH,MLP)(DCTb,GMM)) 1.280
2 ((LFCC,GMM)(SSC,GMM)) 3.063
3 ((PAC,GMM)(SSC,GMM)) 2.934
